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ONE CIVIL LIBERTARIAN AMONG MANY: 
THE CASE OF MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG 
Ira H. Carmen* 
IT is common knowledge that in recent times the constitutional issues of greatest magnitude and of greatest public interest lie 
in the area of civil liberties. These cases almost always call for the 
delicate balancing of the rights of the individual, allegedly pro-
tected by a specific clause in the Constitution, and the duties that 
state or federal authority can exact from citizens in order that 
society may maintain a minimum standard of peace and security. 
It follows, therefore, that it is these often dramatic decisions which 
will largely color the images we have of participating Justices. As-
sume a free speech controversy. Stanley Reed's image? He typically 
voted against a first amendment claim. Sherman Minton? The prob-
abilities are similar. Earl Warren? The opposite. William 0. Doug-
las? He generally supports such claims. Law School classes as well 
as graduate seminars in political science are forever talking about 
the "Black faction" and the "Frankfurter bloc." Comparing and 
contrasting the two has become a fairly common exercise. 
Arthur J. Goldberg came to the Supreme Court in time to par-
ticipate in all of the decisions handed down during the 1962 Term. 
He resigned his office soon after the conclusion of the 1964 Term. 
What image does his name evoke after less than three years on the 
bench? If a member of the American Civil Liberties Union were 
asked what he thought of President Kennedy's appointments to the 
Court, his response would probably be: "Goldberg is a good man, 
but White has been a disappointment." In short, if Goldberg's 
image is at all accurate, the probabilities favor his support of a 
"libertarian" as opposed to a "societal" interpretation of appropri-
ate provisions of the Constitution. On the other hand, if our hypo-
thetical A.C.L.U. advocate, or anyone else for that matter, were 
asked to generalize about Goldberg's point of view vis-a-vis other 
Justices with a similar orientation, that is, if he were asked whether 
there are any significant differences among the so-called "liberta-
rian" ideologies presently represented on the Court, the chances are 
good that his response would be vague and indecisive. 
This paper has two basic purposes: 
I. To demonstrate empirically that Mr. Justice Goldberg, was, 
in fact, inclined to espouse the constitutional philosophy 
• Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Coe College.-Ed. 
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relating to personal rights which his image projects. An ex-
tension of the use of appropriate techniques will also permit 
a classification of his eight colleagues along a "liberty-au-
thority" continuum for the same period of time. 
2. To analyze the similarities and, more important, the dis-
similarities between Goldberg and other Justices of a similar 
ideological bent so as to understand better the complexities 
of his civil libertarian commitment. 
If, indeed, there is a "Black bloc" with an individualistic credo, 
the scholar must do more than isolate this credo from competing 
constitutional philosophies. He must also acquaint himself with 
its internal dynamics. Insofar as Arthur Goldberg is concerned, he 
must present his subject not just as a member of an alliance, but 
as an individual as well. 
I. MODE OF ANALYSIS AND EMERGING BLOCS 
The process which has been selected to determine those Justices 
who, during the 1962-1964 Terms, seemed to espouse the constitu-
tional doctrine of "libertarianism" is somewhat different from other 
quantitative approaches that have been used to discern judicial 
voting propensities.1 First, each formal opinion or per curiam hold-
ing which contained a clear divergence of opinion on a civil liber-
ties issue was included in the sample. The phrase "civil liberties 
issue" comprises all claims of privilege brought to the Supreme 
Court which were predicated on the first eight amendments, the 
fourteenth2 and fifteenth amendments, and other specific clauses in 
the Constitution which can reasonably be thought to preserve 
fundamental liberties of the person, such as the prohibition against 
bills of attainder and the guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus. 
Second, in coding the responses of Justices to conflicting inter-
pretations of these provisions, two mutually exclusive indices were 
developed. The first assigned "libertarian" votes to Supreme Court 
members who specifically opposed a "societal" interpretation held 
to be valid by at least one of their number. In other words, should 
the Justices split in resolving a fourth amendment issue, those who 
1. See Appendix A for a critical analysis of the techniques that have been utilized 
by political scientists C. Herman Pritchett, Glendon Schubert and others. 
2. However, claims which sought to invoke the fourteenth amendment's protec-
tion of property interests were not scored except for those instances in which the 
"just compensation" provision was being applied to state action. It is clear that the 
civil libertarians on the Court are precisely those Justices who most vigorously op-
pose the "invisible radiations" of substantive due process or equal protection as to 
this class of cases. See, e.g., American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965). 
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supported the community's interest in the fruits of a search or 
seizure would be coded as being opposed to those who found in 
favor of the individual's interest in being free from government in-
terference; the former would therefore be viewed as having expressed 
"pro-societal" sentiments while the latter would be considered as 
having advocated a "pro-libertarian" posture. The second index 
consisted of Mr. Justice Goldberg's "pairs" with each of his col-
leagues in these cases irrespective of the attitude espoused. 
It should be obvious that these indices could not have been 
constructed without a careful content analysis of the cases involved. 
Some of the guidelines used in performing this task deserve men-
tion. First, no formal or per curiam opinion was included unless 
a unique constitutional question was in dispute. For example, con-
sider a per curiam decision in which the Court reversed the lower 
court's decision in a one-sentence opinion, citing as authority only 
an earlier case, while the dissenters merely made note of their op-
position as explicated in that prior case.3 Or, consider the several 
reapportionment cases decided (by formal opinion) on the basis 
of Reynolds v. Sims.4 Several of these have been excluded from the 
count of holdings because once one knows that the Court advocates 
the "one man-one vote" rule there is nothing in the facts of these 
later controversies which makes them unique.5 Second, Justices are 
coded together even if they did not join one another's opinions 
if content analysis reveals that they stand as one on the constitu-
tional issue in question. This criterion might be applicable to those 
dissenting separately, to those concurring separately, and to both 
concurring and dissenting Justices vis-a-vis the ~pinion of the Court. 
It follows, therefore, that content analysis may also reveal that con-
currences are in the nature of dissents, in that they represent dis-
agreements along the "libertarian" dimension. 
The principle difference, however, between the mode of classifi-
cation utilized in this study and others that have been attempted 
is that this technique places greater emphasis on the constitutional 
nuances of the cases in the sample and permits the counting of 
several issues of importance in a single case. Consider A Quantity 
of Books v. Kansas.6 The attorney general of Kansas had directed 
a county sheriff to seize and impound, pending a hearing, copies of 
3. See, e.g., Fields v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 522 (1963). 
4. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
5. See, e.g., WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, Inc., 377 U.S. 633 (1964). However, Lucas 
v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964), was included because of the referendum 
facet of that case. Mr. Justice Harlan is coded in opposition to the Court's holding even 
though he felt his dissent in Reynolds was sufficient to cover the issues presented. 
6. 378 U.S. 205 (1964). 
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certain paperback novels which he deemed obscene. In an ex parte 
proceeding conducted prior to confiscation, a district judge perused 
several of the titles, concluded that the books appeared to be ob-
scene, and issued an order to effect the seizure. By a vote of seven 
to two, the Supreme Court reversed the state supreme court's deci-
sion upholding the attorney general's actions. Four of the Justices 
(Brennan, Warren, Goldberg, and White) thought that the pro-
cedure was a violation of first amendment rights because it did not 
adequately safeguard against the suppression of books which were 
not obscene. Justices Black and Douglas, on the other hand, be-
lieved that the state could not pass any law inhibiting the dissemi-
nation of allegedly obscene books. They did not "find it necessary 
to consider the procedural questions" which had buttressed Mr. 
Justice Brennan's opinion.7 Mr. Justice Stewart supplied the seventh 
vote by noting that he had read the books, that he considered them 
protected by the first amendment, and that, therefore, they could 
not be proscribed whatever the means. He added, however, that 
the law would be constitutional if it were applied to hard-core por-
nography. In dissent, Justices Clark and Harlan argued that the 
state could reasonably ban the books in question and that the means 
used in this particular case did not violate first amendment priv-
ileges. 
This is an instance in which controversy was so bitter that no 
opinion was ·written for the Court. It is submitted that the only 
feasible way to unravel the conflicting constitutional philosophies 
at issue in this case is to apply content analysis to the opinions of 
the Justices. In this way the subtle shadings of "libertarianism" be-
come more manifest, and the divisions among Supreme Court mem-
bers are more clearly exposed. The first cleavage appears to center 
around the validity of the procedures invoked by Kansas officials 
to deal with obscene literature. Four Justices denounced these 
practices as violations of first amendment liberties; three Justices, 
Harlan, Clark, and Stewart, opposed this conclusion;8 Justices Black 
and Douglas did not even discuss the procedural aspect of the case 
and therefore should not be coded as participants in its resolution. 
A second significant issue in this case deals with whether the books 
themselves were obscene. While this is also a first amendment ques-
tion, it is of a much different nature than the procedural inquiry. 
This is illustrated by Stewart's concurrence, for he found that the 
7. Id. at 213. 
8. Stewart was noncommittal on the constitutionality of the statute vis-a-vis the 
books which the judge had not inspected in advance of seizure. This is irrelevant for 
present purposes, however. 
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procedures were valid, but agreed with Black and Douglas that 
the books were not obscene; only Harlan and Clark thought that 
these volumes could be suppressed; since the other four Justices 
deliberately avoided the question of obscenity, their votes cannot 
be counted on this issue.9 
The initial step to pinpoint "libertarian" sentiment on the 
Court was to locate those cases in a particular term which contained 
divergent interpretations of relevant constitutional issues. Partici-
pations and "libertarian" responses were counted, and percentages 
were computed by dividing the former into the latter. Looking first 
at the 1962 Term, it can be seen that twenty decisions including 
twenty-four issues qualified for tabulation.10 
TABLE A 
LIBERTARIAN REsPONSES, 1962 TERM 
Participations Libertarian Responses Percentage 
Douglas 24 24 100 
Warren 24 22 92 
Black 24 21 88 
Goldberg 24 21 88 
Brennan 24 21 88 
White 24 12 50 
Stewart 24 8 33 
Clark 24 8 33 
Harlan 24 3 13 
These figures confirm the fact that there were five members of 
the Court who consistently construed the relevant provisions of the 
Constitution so as to favor the personal rights of the individual.10a 
However, the identification of ideological clusters in Supreme Court 
decision-making requires more than the casuistic "these Justices 
seem to vote alike most of the time." A more rigorous test which 
could well be applied in our study is Schubert's Index of Inter-
agreement, which is computed by taking each pair of Justices in 
the sample and dividing their joint participations into their joint 
9. Under the criteria established for application of this "issues test," a third 
cleavage would ordinarily have to be coded. This would have the effect of setting 
off Black and Douglas from those Justices who believed that obscenity could be 
proscribed as a matter of law. This issue, however, is dealt with in another con-
troversy, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). See note 20 infra and accompanying 
text. 
10. Appendixes B, C, and D provide a list of cases scored for the 1962, 1963 and 
1964 Terms respectively. Those decisions which cover more than one issue are also 
noted as are those judgments in which so-called "libertarians" are found on op-
posite sides. 
10a. Using a much different approach, Schubert has rated Goldberg's "libertarian" 
affinities during this term as less strong than those of Douglas, Black, Warren, and 
Brennan in that order. See Schubert, Report and Analysis of the 1962 Term Predic-
tions, in JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 582 (Schubert, ed. 1964). 
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votes.11 In Schubert's judgment, an Index of Interagreement of 
seventy per cent is high, an Index of sixty to sixty-nine per cent 
is moderate, and an Index below sixty per cent is low. The aims 
and techniques that underlie this study differ from Schubert's only 
in that we are: (1) coding "issues" rather than "votes"; and (2) 
concentrating on the voting patterns of one Justice in relation to 
his colleagues, rather than formulating generalizations about all nine 
Justices in interaction with one another. Thus, our Index was 
obtained by dividing the number of Mr. Justice Goldberg's joint 
participations into the number of his joint agreements. The appli-
cation of this Index to the selected cases taken from the 1962 Term 
shows that Goldberg had a startlingly high interagreement quotient 
with Black, Douglas, Warren, and Brennan, a moderate kinship 







































In the 1963 Term, twenty-three cases including thirty-five issues 
were found to be appropriate for our purposes. The strength of 
each Justice's "libertarian" credo is as follows: 
TABLE C 
LIBERTARIAN REsPONSES, 1963 TER.>J 
Participations Libertarian Responses Percentage 
Douglas 30 27 90 
Goldberg 33 28 85 
Black 32 26 81 
Brennan 30 21 70 
Warren 33 21 64 
Stewart 30 14 47 
White 28 13 46 
Clark 32 6 19 
Harlan 32 1 3 
Justice Goldberg's "libertarian" predispositions which were evi-
dent in the 1962 Term continued substantially unchanged during 
11. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 91 (1959). 
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the 1963 session. In this regard, his record of consistency was 
matched by those of Black and Douglas, the latter having proven 
himself to be more amenable to the personal rights at issue than 
his colleagues in both of these years. The Chief Justice, on the other 
hand, showed a sharp falling off in his civil liberties commitment, 
having descended from a peak of ninety-two to sixty-four per cent. 
Mr. Justice Brennan, to a lesser extent, moved in a similar direc-
tion. Among the "non-libertarians" of the 1962 Term, Mr. Justice 
White, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, occupied a middle position 
on our continuum, while Justices Clark and Harlan became far 
more "authority-oriented" than they had been. It is obvious that 
during this term several issues were presented which tended to un-
dermine the solidarity of the "libertarian" faction. The nature of 
these controversies also caused the others to become even more 
widely spread along the spectrum than had heretofore been the 
case. How this increasing diffusion of the Court affected Mr. Justice 







































The application of the Index of Interagreement to these data 
finds Goldberg's intense bond with Douglas, Brennan, and Warren 
continuing into 1963, while his link with his fellow Kennedy ap-
pointee, Mr. Justice White, was no longer of consequence. The 
most significant insight that is captured in these statistics, however, 
can be gleaned from a close inspection of Goldberg's ties with 
Black and the Chief Justice. Justice Black, as has been seen, main-
tained his civil liberties orientation in 1963, while the Chief Justice 
adopted a far more "balanced" view in adjudicating these issues. 
Yet Goldberg's attachment to attitudes expressed by the Chief Jus-
tice was stronger than was his acceptance of Black's ideas; indeed, 
his sixty-seven per cent affiliation with the latter was only at the 
"moderate" level of cohesion. Clearly, Goldberg's conception of 
valid "libertarianism" varied appreciably from Black's notions dur-
ing this term. 
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Turning to the 1964 session, twenty-six cases containing thirty-
four issues appear to qualify for consideration. 
TABLE E 
LIBERTARIAN REsPONSES, 1964 TERM 
Participations Libertarian Responses Percentage 
Douglas 34 29 85 
Black 33 22 67 
Goldberg 34 22 65 
Warren 31 18 58 
Brennan 33 16 48 
Stewart 32 12 38 
White 33 11 33 
Clark 33 11 33 
Harlan 33 6 18 
Of the Justices who, in 1962, gave overwhelming support to in-
dividual rights, only Douglas had managed to hold his ground. 
Goldberg and Black still took an "anti-societal" position two-thirds 
of the time, but their commitments had obviously abated some-
what.11a The decline of "libertarianism" was most evident in the 
cases of Warren and Brennan; indeed, the latter was far closer to 
Stewart, White, and Clark than he was to Douglas. One can say 
without dispute that there was no civil liberties bloc during the 
1964 Term. 
Surely one might expect this diffusion in coping with civil 
liberties controversies to leave its imprint on the propensities of 
Justices to align themselves with their brethren. This expectation 








































The Index of Interagreement illustrates the fact that Goldberg 
again exhibited a high degree of affinity with Justices Douglas, War-
lla. Spaeth, through the use of Guttman scaiing, has concluded that, "[i]n the 1963 
and 1964 terms, Goldberg's support of civil liberties was exceeded only by Justice 
Douglas." See SPAETH, THE WARREN COURT 28 (1966). This generalization is clearly not 
consistent with the 1964 Term analysis herein presented. 
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ren, and Brennan. Although Brennan voted less than fifty per cent 
of the time for a "pro-libertarian" result, he still agreed with Gold-
berg eighty-five per cent of the time. Obviously, these two members 
of the Court must have voted together in opposition to the civil 
liberties views of others; furthermore, it must be remembered that 
Goldberg himself voiced "libertarian" sentiments only sixty-five 
per cent of the time. The break between Goldberg and Black 
reached a crescendo during this term. Each continued to support 
civil libertarian claims, although in a less intense manner than 
before, but their Index of Interagreement points up a real ideolog-
ical hostility between them. Note also the extraordinarily high rate 
of concurrence between Goldberg and Clark and, indeed, Gold-
berg's moderate support for attitudes expressed by White and 
Stewart. What had happened, evidently, was that the "anti-authori-
tarian" philosophies of Black and Goldberg were functioning in 
an inverse relationship; each was resisting the other's "libertarian" 
sorties. Only this opposition to Black's brand of civil liberties can 
explain Goldberg's new-found affinity with the voting habits of 
Mr. Justice Clark, whose "societal" predilections had been manifest 
throughout these three terms. 
Thus far, our analysis of Goldberg's attitudes on civil liberties 
questions has stressed the evolution of these sentiments as compared 
to those of others and as gauged against an abstract "freedom v. au-
thority" model. A summary of the results obtained over the entire 
three terms will be useful in assessing the total picture. Beginning 
first with "libertarianism," a statistically more meaningful ex-
pression of each Justice's affiliation with this doctrine may be at-
tained by dividing the total number of "civil libertarian" choices of 
each Justice by the total number of participations. 
TABLE G 
LIBERTARIAN REsPONSES, 1962-64 TERMS 
Participations Libertarian Responses Percentage 
Douglas 88 80 91 
Goldberg 91 71 78 
Black 89 69 78 
Warren 88 61 69 
Brennan 87 58 67 
White 85 36 42 
Stewart 86 34 40 
Clark 89 25 28 
Harlan 89 10 11 
The Court was clearly divided during these three terms into 
two competing factions. The first, ranging from Douglas to Bren-
nan, espoused a general commitment to the "libertarian" ideology. 
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With respect to Warren and Brennan, this li~kage could be classi-
fied as moderate, but nonetheless significant. As for the other four 
members of the Court, the differences between them were clear-cut 
at times, but each evidently rejected the idea that "libertarianism" 
is a value to be prized above "authoritarianism," at least so far as 
our sample of issues is concerned. 
A three-term analysis of Mr. Justice Goldberg's joint participa-
tions and policy agreements yields the following results: 
TABLE H 
INDEX OF lNTERAGREEMENT FOR MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG, 1962-64 TERMS 
Percentage 
Participations Agreements Agreement 
Brennan 87 77 89 
Warren 88 75 85 
Douglas 86 72 84 
Black 86 55 64 
White 84 53 63 
Stewart 85 49 58 
Clark 88 41 47 
Harlan 87 29 33 
The startling fact revealed by these figures is that the Goldberg-
Black Index of Interagreement was only a rather tepid sixty-four 
per cent. A review of the statistics for each of the three terms shows 
that this moderate agreement between them was largely the product 
of their 1964 schism. Yet, the two were less than one percentage 
point apart in their devout "libertarianism" during these three 
sessions. The cleavage between them which is indicated by their 
interagreement quotient had developed to such classic proportions 
that Goldberg's ties for the three terms to an "anti-libertarian" 
(White) were on an approximate par with his affinity for Black's 
views. A second important observation culled from these data is 
that Goldberg's interagreement with the two so-called "moderate 
libertarians" (Warren and Brennan) was even more pronounced 
than his three-term alliance with a fellow "arch libertarian" (Doug-
las). The disparity in the interagreement figures is very slight in-
deed, but, significantly, it is largely the product of 1964 decisions. 
One might hypothesize that during this last year of Goldberg's 
tenure on the bench, both Black and Douglas indulged in "libertar-
ian" sallies which were unacceptable to his more moderate posture. 
The quantification of variables is of little help in trying to 
assess the delicate shadings of opinion which separated Mr. Justice 
Goldberg from those of his colleagues who shared his "anti-authori-
tarian" predispositions. One must inquire into the dynamics of the 
so-called "libertarian bloc." Unfortunately, in the space available, 
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it is not feasible to do more than highlight the major strands of 
agreement and disagreement that seem to characterize Goldberg's 
relations with each of the members of this bloc. 
II. GOLDBERG-BRENNAN 
Statistics have told us that, of all the "libertarians," Mr. Justice 
Brennan most often aligned himself with Goldberg. They agreed 
eighty-nine per cent of the time. It is also true, however, that Gold-
berg was somewhat more prone to respond to alleged individual 
rights than was Brennan. Indeed, a review of the cases yields the 
interesting fact that on no issue did Brennan support a "libertarian" 
result in opposition to Goldberg's preference for a "societal" value. 
The key difference between the two appears to center around 
the rights of the individual in the courtroom. Six of the ten issues 
which found them in disagreement were related to the defendant's 
rights in a criminal proceeding. The most dramatic instance of this 
divergence of opinion concerned the use of television during both 
a pretrial hearing and the trial itself. The petitioner was Billie Sol 
Estes, the Texas financier who had been found guilty of swindling. 
Mr. Justice Goldberg, agreeing with a majority of five,12 voted to 
reverse on the ground that the use of television had "set it apart in 
the public mind as an extraordinary case,"13 and that, therefore, 
due process had been abridged. Mr. Justice Brennan, on the other 
hand, joined Mr. Justice Stewart in claiming that certiorari had 
been granted only to consider the question whether a judge, even 
during the trial of a well-known personality, could allow television 
facilities to be used under carefully circumscribed conditions. Jus-
tice Brennan believed the question must be answered in the affirma-
tive. 
The substance of the controversy presented in Estes, however, 
did not end there. Adhering to an argument presented by the Chief 
Justice in a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Goldberg espoused 
the notion that under no condition could television be counte-
nanced in a court of law. While some might argue that the intro-
duction of this medium into the courtroom could serve the useful 
purpose of educating the public, Mr. Chief Justice Warren suc-
cinctly noted that "the function of trial is not to provide an edu-
cational experience," but to illuminate the truth.14 Justice Bren-
nan, on the other hand, supported Justice Stewart's contention that 
12. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). 
13. Id. at 5!18. 
14. Id. at 575. 
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it was imprudent to escalate into a constitutional rule the policy 
determination that the use of television was unwise. 
A second important case which illustrates Goldberg's desire 
to pioneer new constitutional ground rules for the courtroom in-
volved Governor Ross Barnett of Mississippi. The Court held that 
Barnett did not have a right to a jury trial in a criminal contempt 
proceeding.15 Of the "libertarians," only Brennan was able to sub-
scribe to this view. In a highly scholarly dissent, Goldberg argued 
that a thorough investigation of the history of criminal contempt 
proceedings tried before a judge made it clear that, until relatively 
recent times, no one had believed that non-jury procedures could 
ever be used to mete out anything but trivial penalties; since Bar-
nett, if convicted, would be adjudged guilty of a most serious crime, 
it was proper for the Court to shield him in advance by assuring 
him a trial by jury. 
In a somewhat novel footnote to the majority opinion in Barnett, 
Mr. Justice Clark issued the following caveat to the lower courts: 
don't be too harsh on this man because some members of our tribu-
nal believe that only trivial penalties can be exacted by judges in 
contempt proceedings.16 It is hard to believe that Clark would have 
gone out of his way to announce this dictum if only Goldberg and 
those who shared his opinion (Warren and Douglas) adhered to 
this position. Quite possibly there were members of the majority 
who also held this view. If so, Brennan, because of his "libertarian-
ism," is a likely suspect. This assumption, if valid, may suggest 
an interesting difference between Brennan and Goldberg. Brennan 
might well have believed that because the question of the severity 
of penalties issued in contempt cases had not been certified to the 
Supreme Court for adjudication, it was therefore the Justices' 
responsibility merely to issue a warning in the hope that a warning 
would be sufficient. This approach, of course, would afford the 
Court the opportunity of avoiding a most difficult constitutional 
question. Goldberg, on the other hand, pursued a more activist 
course by meeting the issue squarely so that the lower courts would 
be more clearly apprised of the law. 
This cleavage between Goldberg and Brennan as to the applica-
tion of due process considerations to criminal proceedings may be 
illustrated by reference to two other Supreme Court decisions. In 
the first of these, Goldberg went on record as opposing, except in 
the most pressing circumstances, the adjudication of a contempt 
15. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964). 
16. Id. at 695 n.12. 
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charge before the judge who had issued the initial citation.17 The 
second case involved an allegation by a Negro petitioner that no 
Negro had ever served on a petit jury in Talladega County, Ala-
bama, and that this discrimination was a product of Alabama's use 
of the peremptory strike system to eliminate members of his race 
from such juries.18 A majority of the Justices, including Brennan, 
found that the petitioner had not satisfied his burden of proving 
that state officials had indeed perverted the peremptory challenge 
to this end. Goldberg, dissenting with Warren and Douglas, argued 
that once it had been shown that no Negro had ever served on a 
petit jury within the county, a prima fade case of discrimination 
had been established and the burden of proof therefore shifted to 
the state, which was "in the better position to develop the facts as 
to how the exclusion came about."19 
It would be a mistake to emphasize these disparities in con-
stitutional philosophy. When a concurrence level of eighty-nine per 
cent has been established, it should be obvious that one is dealing 
with two men who use the same pair of bifocals. It therefore is 
important to devote at least as much attention to the significant 
agreements between the two as to their moments of discord. Two 
holdings are especially useful for this purpose because they show 
other members of the Court moving in several divergent directions 
while Brennan and Goldberg stay together. 
The first of these is Jacobellis v. Ohio.20 Nico Jacobellis was 
convicted of showing what the courts of Ohio believed to be an 
obscene movie, "The Lovers." His contention was simply that the 
film was not obscene and that he had thus been deprived of a first 
amendment privilege. Two of the "libertarians," Black and Douglas, 
argued that allegedly obscene movies could not be proscribed by 
any procedures. Neither Brennan nor Goldberg could accept this 
sweeping approach, but they did agree that appellant's first amend-
ment rights had been violated. In this respect, the four were joined 
by White, concurring in the result, and by Stewart, who wrote a 
separate opinion expressing his individual views.21 On the other 
hand, one "libertarian,'' Mr. Chief Justice Warren, joined by Jus-
tices Clark and Harlan, thought that Jacobellis could be found 
guilty and, in addition, drastically disagreed with the others regard-
17. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964). 
18. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
19. Id. at 240. A fifth case of the same species as those discussed above is United 
States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964). 
20. 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
21. His opinion, however, in no way represented a departure from the Goldberg-
Brennan thesis prese:ited below. See text accompanying note 23 infra. 
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ing the role of the Court in obscenity cases. Mr. Chief Justice Warren 
believed that the Supreme Court should not make a de novo review 
of every book or movie found by the lower courts to be obscene, 
but, rather, that it should invest lower courts with considerable lati-
tude in applying the standards for obscenity which the Court had es-
tablished in the Roth and Alberts decisions.22 Furthermore, it was 
Warren's view that when the majority in Roth and Alberts had 
stated that allegedly obscene works were to be evaluated in terms of 
"contemporary community standards," the guidelines to be used by 
the lower courts were the norms of each community desiring to 
enforce obscenity laws. To Goldberg and Brennan, each of these 
contentions flew in the face of the principle that "it is, after all, 
a national Constitution we are expounding."23 In a nutshell, this 
tandem agreed that laws criminally punishing those who dissemi-
nated obscene materials were valid, that the definition of obscenity 
embraced national cultural values, that it was the Supreme Court's 
function to make a determination on its own as to the obscenity of 
each work questioned, and that "The Lovers" was not obscene. 
Perhaps the most controversial decision of the 1964 Term was 
the Court's voiding of a Connecticut law which made the use of 
contraceptives a criminal offense.24 Among the "libertarians," only 
Black could not accept Mr. Justice Douglas' assertion that "the 
First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from 
governmental intrusion" and that the police could not constitution-
ally "search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale 
signs ... " that the law had been violated.25 But Goldberg, in a 
concurring opinion in which he was joined by Brennan and Warren, 
went much further than this. He stated that the due process pro-
vision of the fourteenth amendment protects personal rights which 
could be termed "fundamental" regardless of whether they could 
be buttressed by the specifics set out in the Bill of Rights. This 
conviction was flatly rejected by Justices Black and Douglas, who 
saw in this a resurrection of Lochner v. New York.26 Finally, both 
Goldberg and Brennan rejected Black's and Douglas' belief that due 
process contained in the fourteenth amendment "incorporates" the 
specifics of the first eight amendments.27 Griswold, then, like ]acobel-
22. Roth v. United States; Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
23. 378 U.S. at 195. 
24. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
25. Id. at 483, 485. 
26. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
27. Mr. Justice Black's views are articulated in his dissenting opinion in Griswold, 
381 U.S. at 507, and Mr. Justice· Douglas' views are outlined in Malloy v. Hogan, 
378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
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lis, illustrates the middle position that Goldberg and Brennan some-
times occupied while other members of the "libertarian bloc" split 
in various directions. 
III. GOLDBERG-WARREN 
The relationship between the value choices of the Chief Jus-
tice and Goldberg's "libertarian" commitment is very similar to the 
relationship benveen Brennan and Goldberg. Like Brennan, War-
ren attained a somewhat lower score (sixty-nine per cent) than Gold-
berg on the "liberty-authority" continuum, while exhibiting a 
startlingly positive concurrence ratio with Goldberg (eighty-five per 
cent). Warren and Goldberg disagreed on only thirteen relevant 
issues, with Warren being scored as favorable to a "societal" result 
in ten of these. However, none of the three questions on which 
Goldberg assumed an "anti-libertarian" position contrary to that 
of the Chief Justice involved major civil liberties issues. In one 
such case, containing two issues, petitioner had been convicted of 
income tax evasion through the use of evidence obtained in part 
pursuant to a Treasury Department policy which offered delin-
quent taxpayers the option of escaping criminal prosecution by 
freely disclosing their violations.28 While the evidence clearly indi-
cated that the taxpayer had confessed only so as to perpetrate a 
fraud on federal officials, Justices Warren, Douglas, and Black, 
arguing that the admission of guilt had been induced, believed that 
the use of this information violated the self-incrimination provision 
of the fifth amendment. To the majority, including Goldberg, 
petitioner's confession was not only voluntary, but was also calcu-
lated to undermine the basic purpose of the program-the avoid-
ance of criminal penalties. Moreover, the majority rejected the 
minority's contention that subsequently discovered inaccuracies in 
the testimony of an important trial witness would necessarily entitle 
the defendant to a new trial, especially since no allegation had been 
made that the witness had committed perjury. 
The second decision in which Warren took a more "libertarian" 
approach than Goldberg raised the question of probable cause for 
a search warrant.29 Speaking for a majority of seven which upheld 
the warrant, Goldberg noted that the warrant used the phrases 
"upon observations made by me" and "upon personal knowledge" 
in designating some of the sources of the incriminating informa-
tion. 30 Warren, dissenting with Douglas, tried to show that, taken 
28. Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341 (1963). 
29. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). 
30. Id. at ll0. 
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as a whole, the warrant was a tissue of hearsay because no particular 
item of information was identified as within the first-hand knowl-
edge of the officer. To Goldberg, this was a mechanical reading of 
the warrant; hearsay might well serve as the basis for establishing 
probable cause if the circumstances so required. 
What are the issues on which Goldberg and Warren disagreed, 
with Goldberg cast in the role of a civil liberties advocate? Of the 
ten constitutional questions, six involved the right of free speech. 
The most drastic split between Goldberg and Warren stemmed from 
their conceptions of the role of the Supreme Court in dealing with 
the suppression of obscenity. Jacobellis contained three of the six 
first amendment issues which found Goldberg and the Chief Justice 
on opposite sides. A strong sense of the pragmatic runs through 
Warren's dissent in this case: What criteria, he asked, can the Court 
use to enunciate a set of national moral standards? How can the 
Justices expect local courts to divine these guidelines? How can 
the Supreme Court institute a de novo review of every piece of 
alleged smut that lower courts believe to be proscribable under 
Roth-Alberts? Who are nine men to say that a movie which contains 
an implication of mouth-genital sexual gratification is not obscene?31 
Goldberg, on the other hand, placed emphasis on the concept of 
free speech as a national constitutional privilege which protects all 
Americans no matter where they live. If it is to be the responsibility 
of the Supreme Court to define obscenity, he said, then the Justices 
could not simply lay down a formula and let the states act as ad-
ministrative agencies in their application of that formula. Free 
speech is too pre-eminent a value in our system to allow such lati-
tude. 
This priority given to free speech when it is weighed against the 
government's alleged responsibility to protect the public against 
deleterious consequences of speech is again illustrated in the Gold-
berg-Warren cleavage over the constitutionality of state laws dealing 
with libel suits. It was Goldberg's belief that a public official could 
not recover damages from a private citizen who had libeled him, no 
matter how malicious the intent of the speaker.32 To allow recovery, 
he felt, would be to place the prerogatives of public criticism in the 
hands of "a jury's evaluation of the speaker's state of mind."33 It 
followed from this that a state law which branded the libeling of a 
31. For some relevant comments on the travails of "The Lovers" before various 
motion picture censor boards, see CARMEN, MOVIES, CENSORSHIP AND THE LAw 87, 192, 
268, 283 (1966). 
32. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
33. Id. at 300. 
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public official a crime was also unconstitutional even as applied 
to a person who knew his statement to be false.34 The Chief Justice 
believed that a state might well determine that "the use of the 
known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of demo-
cratic government," and that "calculated falsehood falls into that 
class of utterances which 'are no essential part of any exposition of 
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.' "35 This is precisely the kind 
of argument that Goldberg had espoused in his split with Black and 
Douglas over a state's right to suppress obscenity. It is extremely 
important to note that Goldberg would give citizens greater leeway 
in criticizing public officers than he would give the writer or film-
maker in exploring man's sex life. 
The final case which shows Goldberg and Warren on opposite 
sides on matters of first amendment coverage stemmed from a State 
Department order refusing to allow a citizen to travel to Cuba to 
inspect for himself the ways in which Fidel Castro was leading his 
people toward "social justice."36 It is true, Warren wrote for the 
majority, that there are few inhibitions on travel which would not 
decrease one's access to knowledge; nonetheless, the Chief Execu-
tive, through his agent, might reasonably find in this instance that 
the United States policy of quarantine toward Cuba would be 
better enforced if inquisitive Americans confined their inquiries to 
newspaper reading. In dissent, Goldberg pointed out that, if the 
State Department could keep Americans from going to Cuba be-
cause of its communist ties, it could, on similar grounds, also keep 
them from going to any other communist state. Given the fact that 
the right to travel is an essential attribute of free speech, a more 
definite showing of a national emergency would be necessary to 
justify this restriction of an individual's right to obtain information. 
Despite their differences, both Goldberg and Warren accepted 
the "libertarian" ideology, and this created a bond between them 
which was as important as the bond between Goldberg and Brennan. 
In Griswold, for example, Goldberg, Warren, and Brennan joined 
hands not only in widening the first amendment's new-found pro-
tection of privacy rights, but also in the view that the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment could be used to strike down 
governmental infringements of personal liberties that were thought 
to "shock the conscience" of our collective citizenry, as perceived 
34. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
35. Id. at 75. 
36. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). 
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by the Justices. Moreover, Warren joined forces with Goldberg 
more often than not in resisting Brennan's "societal" tendencies in 
cases dealing with the courtroom protections to be afforded the ac-
cused. For example, the Chief Justice chose a "libertarian" posture 
in deciding the questions tendered to the Court in Estes and in the 
determination of the jury discrimination question presented in 
Swain. In addition, he concurred in Goldberg's trenchant defense of 
Ross Barnett's right to a trial by jury, but, also in accord with Gold-
berg's arguments, he resisted the Black-Douglas notion that not 
even trivial penalties could be assessed by a judge in criminal con-
tempt proceedings. This increasingly close relationship between 
Goldberg and Warren was best illustrated in the 1964 Term when 
the Justices resolved twenty-three issues which found the "liber-
tarians" at odds with one another. Of these, Goldberg concurred 
with the Chief Justice in all but three, and with Brennan in all but 
five. As has already been intimated, then, the somewhat more 
intense civil libertarian predispositions which influenced Goldberg 
when contrasted with Brennan and Warren constituted but a minor 
schism when compared with the major discord which appeared to 
exist between Goldberg and both Black and Douglas. 
IV. GOLDBERG-DOUGLAS 
Mr. Justice Douglas established himself as the "libertarian par 
excellence" of the 1962-64 period. He voted against the use of 
society's powers to order the actions of its people in ninety-one per 
cent of the pertinent constitutional questions litigated before the 
Court during those years, putting him well above Goldberg's second-
place seventy-eight per cent. Indeed, Douglas' commitment to the 
personal rights of the individual placed him ahead of all of his col-
leagues in each of these three terms. 
The interagreement quotient between Goldberg and Douglas 
during this time was an intense eighty-four per cent. This ratio, 
however, ranks only third in Mr. Justice Goldberg's hierarchy of 
agreement with the other "libertarian" Justices. While Goldberg's 
civil liberties inclinations, in terms of percentages, placed him as 
distant from Douglas as he was from Warren and Brennan, an 
analysis of the data on a term-by-term basis reveals some interesting 
facts. Goldberg's affinity for Douglas' ideological views shows a 
sharp falling off during the 1964 Term. From a remarkable con-
currence ratio of ninety-three per cent in the 1963 session, their 
interagreement quotient plummeted to a still significantly positive 
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seventy-four per cent one year later. On the other hand, Goldberg's 
concurrence with Warren jumped from seventy-nine to ninety per 
cent during the same period of time. Furthermore, Goldberg's and 
Douglas' adherence to civil liberties values also shows some inter-
term fluctuation; the 1964 Term, for example, found the spread be-
tween them to be a surprisingly wide twenty percentage points. 
It is submitted that there is no single class of controversies that 
accounts for whatever disparities exist in their "libertarian" attitudes. 
Throughout Goldberg's first two years as a Supreme Court Justice, 
he and Douglas parted company in their interpretation of constitu-
tional rights of the individual on only five occasions. It has been 
noted that, in Barnett, Douglas wanted to divest judges of all power 
to mete out penalties in criminal contempt cases.37 It was also his 
belief that no movie could be suppressed merely because it was 
thought to be obscene.38 Furthermore, Douglas was the only mem-
ber of the Court who felt that a Sunday closing law exempting 
from its applicability those who keep another day as their Sabbath 
could be challenged on first amendment grounds.39 On the other 
hand, as an example of their agreement during the 1962 and 1963 
Terms, Goldberg and Douglas joined alone in dissent (the only oc-
casion on which this occurred in the cases coded) to protest the 
manner in which district lines for the House of Representatives were 
allegedly gerrymandered in New York City.40 It was their opinion 
that the state legislature had used race as a guideline so that Harlem 
would have its own representative, and that this contravened the 
principle of equal protection. Nor can it be forgotten that it was 
Goldberg and Douglas, joined only by Warren, who found segrega-
tion of the races by privately owned "public accommodations" to be 
prohibited by the fourteenth amendment.41 
During the 1964 Term, however, Justices Goldberg and Douglas 
disagreed in eight of the thirty-three decisions in which they jointly 
participated. In the more important of these disagreements, it ap-
peared that Goldberg usually was unwilling to follow Douglas in the 
latter's determination to apply rules of law to varying kinds of con-
duct regardless of the circumstances. In Freedman v. Maryland,42 for 
instance, Douglas espoused the notion that movies are entitled to be 
as free from the yoke of the censor as are any of the other mass 
37. It is true that Douglas joined with Goldberg in bis dissenting opinion, but he 
also concurred in Black's more "libertarian" protest. 
38. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
39. Arlan's Dep't Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962). 
40. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). 
41. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
42. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
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media. Thus, he said, "I would put an end to all forms and types 
of censorship .... "43 Goldberg, however, evidently believing that 
motion pictures presented special problems which are not inherent 
in the dissemination of the written word, took the position that a 
limited form of censorship circumscribed by the guarantees of due 
process could be constitutionally upheld. With respect to the guar-
antees of the fourth amendment, Douglas and Black dissented 
against the majority's holding that the Mapp rule44 did not operate 
retrospectively upon cases that had been finalized prior to the 
Court's decision in Mapp.45 The consensus among the majority Jus• 
tices, including Mr. Justice Goldberg, was that there was no all-em-
bracing principle of retroactivity even as to the application of the 
Bill of Rights, but that emphasis must be placed on matters of 
"public policy" and "a consideration of 'particular relations . . . 
and particular conduct . . . .' "46 There was surely a substantial 
difference between applying retrospectively an expansion of the 
right to counsel, where the availability of legal counsel could 
have meant the difference between conviction and acquittal, and 
the Mapp rule, the retroactive application of which would free 
thousands of known guilty parties. To Douglas, such a distinction 
was "more like law-making than construing the Constitution,"47 
and indicated "a disparaging view" of fourth amendment liberties.48 
Two other controversies are also illustrative of the Goldberg-
Douglas cleavage. The first involved the question whether the "one 
man-one vote" principle of apportionment necessitated the use of 
single-member districts.49 Eight members of the Court voted to up-
hold a system by which seats in a state legislature were apportioned 
among counties according to population, but in which all the law-
makers coming from multi-district counties were to be chosen by a 
county-wide vote. Douglas, on the other hand, thought this to be an 
"invidious discrimination" because a person living in a district con-
tained in a populous county had to share his vote with all members 
of the county, while one living in a sparsely settled county voted 
only for a single-district representative. To put Douglas' argument 
succinctly: an apportionment system could not use homesite as a 
criterion for varying schemes of representation. 
In the second illustrative decision, the Court unanimously 
43. Id. at 62. 
44. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
45. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Angelet v. Fay, 381 U.S. 654 (1965). 
46. Linkletter v. Walker, supra note 45, at 627. 
47. Id. at 649. 
48. Id. at 645. 
49. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). 
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voided a Florida statute making it a crime for an unmarried couple 
to occupy habitually the same room in the nighttime if one was 
Negro and the other Caucasion.50 This, said Mr. Justice White, was 
an irrational classification in light of the demands of the equal 
protection clause. If his opinion had said nothing more, there 
would have been no cause for disagreement. But White found it 
necessary to point out that not all laws using race as a criterion for 
determining state regulatory policies were invalid; such laws would 
be upheld if found to be "necessary" to "the accomplishment of a 
permissible state policy."51 This last statement rankled Justices 
Douglas and Stewart. What valid legislative act, they asked, could 
be passed pursuant to the fourteenth amendment which would make 
the color of a man's skin a standard of criminal conduct? Until 
this time, Goldberg's policy notions had led him to oppose any 
public action that even smacked of racism, as is evidenced by his 
dissents in the Harlem district case and in the Alabama peremptory 
challenge decision. Why then did he not concur in Douglas' "liber-
tarian" foray? No one, of course, can say for certain, but the general 
trend of Goldberg's decisions during this period leads one to be-
lieve that he was beginning to chafe ever so slightly against the 
idea that a civil right is always a right no matter what claims society 
makes upon its citizenry. To be more specific, it is quite possible 
that Goldberg saw Douglas' argument as an attack on such prece-
dents as the Japanese exclusion cases.52 
One of the decisions of the Court that requires close examina-
tion as one considers the variations in recent judicial behavior is 
Griswold v. Connecticut;53 few cases seem to tell us as much about 
each of the Justices. In writing his opinion for the majority, Douglas 
denounced the role of the Supreme Court as a "super-legislature." 
It is not the task of the Court, he said, to assess "the wisdom, need, 
and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, 
or social conditions."54 It was this Holmesian expression of self-
restraint which led Goldberg to proclaim, for the first and only 
time, a "libertarian" commitment contrary to Douglas' convictions. 
For the latter, due process guaranteed no substantive rights other 
than those derived from a particular right set out in the first eight 
amendments. For Goldberg, the "liberty of contract" once thought 
to be guaranteed by substantive due process was undoubtedly obso-
50. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
51. Id. at 196. 
52. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
5!l. !l81 U.S. 479 (1965). 
54. Id. at 482. 
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lete, just as it was for Douglas; but Goldberg did not construe this 
to mean that due process could be characterized in a substantive 
sense so as to encompass only those personal liberties set out in the 
Bill of Rights. It was this conviction which led him to embark on 
his famous journey into the ninth amendment "thicket" in order to 
prove his point. It is possible that this resort to a constitutional 
clause long thought to have been interred was not Goldberg's finest 
hour on the Court, but it did demonstrate his displeasure with the 
idea that due process is only shorthand for the Bill of Rights. 
V. GOLDBERG-BLACK 
Our data indicates that the divergence of opinion between Gold-
berg and Black should provide the keenest insight into the dynamics 
of Goldberg's civil liberties predispositions while a member of the 
Supreme Court. No one can doubt that Goldberg and Black were 
equally intense in their determination to rescue the individual from 
alleged infringements of personal rights. Statistics show that each 
scored seventy-eight per cent in his "libertarian" responses over the 
three-term period. Furthermore, their near congruence was all the 
more amazing when examined on a term-by-term basis. During 
each of the three sessions that Goldberg sat on the bench, his "liber-
tarianism" never varied from Black's by more than four percentage 
points. Indeed, when Black's "anti-societal" tendencies suffered a 
radical falling-off during the 1964 Term, a similar change was evi-
dent in Goldberg's policy choices. 
It has already been noted, however, that the interagreement 
ratios for these two men were not marked by such congruence. After 
an interagreement quotient of eighty-three per cent in 1962, the two 
disagreed on ten separate issues during the 1963 Term for a "mod-
erate" cohesiveness of sixty-seven per cent, compared to the Gold-
berg-Warren alliance of seventy-nine per cent and the Goldberg-
Douglas quotient of ninety-three. This rate of dissatisfaction was 
merely a precursor of the events of the 1964 Term, when Goldberg 
disagreed with Black more often than with any of his brethren. 
As a matter of fact, their interagreement score was an insignificant 
forty-seven per cent, compared with a seventy-four per cent agree-
ment between Goldberg and Douglas and the even higher percent-
ages Goldberg attained with Brennan and Warren. 
There were two cases decided during the 1962 Term which help 
to establish a significant disparity in thinking between Black and 
Goldberg. Each case involved alleged invasions of fourth amend-
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ment freedoms. In the first of these, 55 a federal officer with a minifon 
hidden on his person recorded a bribe offer made to him, and this 
evidence was then used to convict the speaker. The majority, with 
Black concurring, affirmed the conviction. In dissent, Justices Gold-
berg, Brennan, and Douglas argued that electronic devices, because 
of the serious intrusion they make into rights of privacy, should be 
subject to the fourth amendment limitations on unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Unless warrants were required in these cases, 
the dissenters claimed, the individual would have no protection 
against invasions by third parties whose presence could never be 
determined. 
In the second case, 56 California police officers, acting without 
a warrant, used a passkey to enter petitioner's apartment, arrested 
him on suspicion of violating narcotics laws, and subsequently dis-
covered marijuana on the premises. A majority of five, including 
Black, found that probable cause existed for making the arrest and 
the ensuing search without a warrant because incriminating state-
ments had been made by informers and also because the police had 
observed several of petitioner's associates dealing in marijuana. Ac-
cording to the majority, there was not an illegal "breaking" without 
notice, for the police were reasonably certain that the petitioner 
had been apprised of their surveillance and might well conceal or 
destroy the incriminating evidence if they did not act immedi-
ately. To Mr. Justice Goldberg and the other "libertarians," this 
was an "unannounced police intrusion into a private home." There 
was nothing in the record to show that the petitioner was about 
to destroy the evidence in his possession because it was not clear that 
the petitioner knew that the police were following him. Indeed, if 
police actions in the instant case could be justified by the mere 
possibility, supposedly based on experience, that evidence would be 
destroyed, the police could break into a suspect's home practically 
at their whim. 
The Justices were called upon to construe the scope of fourth 
amendment protections in only three other controversies during 
the subsequent two terms.57 In each of these cases, Black rejected 
what he conceived to be an overly broad view of these liberties.i1s 
In the only one of these cases in which Black and Goldberg agreed, 
55. Lopez v. United States, 1173 U.S. 427 (1963). 
56. Ker v. California, 1174 U.S. 211 (1968). 
57. This figure excludes Linkletter and Angelet, which involved the retroactivity 
of already established constitutional rights. 
58. Aguilar v. Texas, 1178 U.S. 108 (1964); United States v. Ventresca, !ISO U.S. 
102 (1965); One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 698 (1965). 
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they joined the Court in upholding a search warrant based partially 
on hearsay because there was some evidence that the officer who had 
obtained the warrant possessed sufficient first-hand knowledge to 
verify the hearsay.59 Unfortunately, because Mr. Justice Black con-
curred silently in all five of these search and seizure cases, no overt 
explication can be found in any decision rendered during these 
terms which helps us to understand why Black, the staunch civil 
liberties advocate, had been content with the use of electronic de-
vices to obtain evidence and the use of hearsay to establish probable 
cause for arrests and searches. 
Offsetting Black's "pro-societal" inclinations in the fourth 
amendment cases was his uniquely "libertarian" orientation regard-
ing the rights of the accused in criminal proceedings. The primary 
example of this orientation is Jackson v. Denno,60 in which a five-
man majority, including all of Black's "libertarian" brethren, held 
that a jury entrusted with the power to decide innocence or guilt 
could not also be permitted to determine the voluntariness of the 
defendant's confession. Such a rule was required because there was 
a serious threat that "matters pertaining to the defendant's guilt will 
infect the jury's finding of fact bearing upon voluntariness .... " 61 
In addition, even if the jury disregarded the confession because of 
coercion, one could hardly expect this same panel to suppress the 
fact that the accused had, in reality, confessed. The Court's decision 
contravened Black's devotion to the concept of trial by jury. This 
new doctrine, he believed, seriously undercut the Founding Fathers' 
abiding faith in the jury as the institution best equipped to decide 
factual questions. However, despite his passion for the jury system, 
Black still considered it the duty of reviewing courts to examine the 
record and decide for themselves if confessions had been obtained 
by illegal techniques. In the case at hand, he felt that due process 
had been clearly violated by police officials, whereas the majority 
had refused to consider the factual question of voluntariness. 
The 1964 Term also contained a controversy which saw Black 
split from his "libertarian" colleagues on somewhat similar 
grounds.62 In affirming a conviction for operating an illegal distill-
ery, the Court upheld a federal statute establishing a presumption 
of guilt if an accused could not explain his presence at such a dis-
tillery. Speaking for himself and six others, Justice Stewart found 
that this portion of the law had been drafted because of the practical 
59. United States v. Ventresca, supra note 58. 
60. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
61. Id. at 383. 
62. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965). 
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difficulties inherent in proving actual participation in the illegal 
conduct. It was his view that considerable weight must be accorded 
Congress in drawing conclusions from the behavior of individuals, 
and that the "rationality of the connection 'between the fact proved 
and the ultimate fact assumed'" was beyond doubt.63 However, 
Stewart did emphasize that if guilt had not been demonstrated be-
yond a reasonable doubt, a jury need not convict even if an accused's 
presence went unexplained. Black, the lone dissenter, stated that 
federal officials had violated petitioner's right of trial by jury and 
the guarantee of due process of law. In our constitutional system, 
the jury's function as the sole judge of facts in criminal cases could 
not be undermined by presumptions established by Congress. But, 
even if Congress had the law-making capacity to create presump-
tions of guilt, it still did not follow that consistent with the guar-
antee of due process, the mere unexplained presence at a still, in 
and of itself, necessarily constituted sufficient grounds for guilt.64 
The issue which seems to exemplify best Black's and Goldberg's 
divergent notions of "libertarianism" was the question in Bell v. 
Maryland65 whether racial segregation in privately owned public 
accommodations violated the equal protection clause. The resolution 
of the constitutional question presented in this case was obviously 
very important for the entire country, but perhaps equally impor-
tant was that it may well have had an incalculable impact upon 
the future of "libertarianism" on the Court. 
Petitioners had been found guilty in the courts of Maryland for 
trespassing upon the premises of a restaurant which served whites 
only. After ther request for relief had been denied by the Maryland 
Court of Appeals, but before certiorari was granted, the state legis-
lature passed a public accommodations statute making it obligatory 
for owners of these establishments to serve members of all races on 
an equal basis. By a vote of six to three, the Justices reversed the con-
victions, relying on the newly enacted state law despite Maryland's 
general saving clause which was designed to protect state convic-
tions from the common-law effect of supervening statutes. 
Four members of the Court refused to accept this conclusion. 
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring separately, found that Maryland 
had made reference to the new law only to show why certiorari 
ought not to be granted; furthermore, the issue of the state legisla-
63. Id. at 66. 
64. Two other decisions of the same genre which found Black at odds with Gold-
berg were United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964), where Black opposed the 
meting out of any penalties by judges in criminal contempt proceedings, and Boles T. 
Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 (1964). 
65. 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
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tion had been shunted aside during oral argument and conferences 
because it was felt to have been frivolous. He then went on to find 
the "apartheid" inherent in racial exclusion policies of public ac-
commodations owners to be contrary to the fourteenth amendment. 
Mr. Justice Black, on the other hand, speaking for himself and 
Justices White and Harlan, agreed that the Court had made a 
grievous error in not facing the equal protection problem squarely, 
but reached a different conclusion than did Douglas. Referring first 
to the matter of state action, he said that everyone agreed that a 
state could not use its power to foist second-class rights on any 
race. But the Maryland courts had not done this by merely enforc-
ing the restaurant owner's prejudices against serving Negroes. As 
for cases like Shelley v. Kraemer,66 where the Justices had found 
court enforced restrictive covenants to be unconstitutional state 
action, Black claimed that, in reality, the Court had done nothing 
more than protect federal rights guaranteed by the Civil Rights 
Acts of 1866 and 1870. And, although the restaurant was licensed by 
the city, the licensing involved no attempt to force policies of segre-
gation upon property owners. Secondly, responding to the argument 
that, irrespective of state involvement, the fourteenth amendment 
was applicable to privately owned businesses which hold themselves 
out to the public, Black merely noted that the Court ought not to 
overthrow a veritable host of precedents that had been decided to 
the contrary. It is at this point that his opinion is most balanced 
and perceptive. Legislative bodies, subject to the influence of public 
debate, could draw the lines necessary to set apart those private 
activities so wrapped up in public service that they ought to be open 
to all regardless of race. However, if the Court were to lay down an 
inflexible constitutional rule on the subject, then the Congress 
and state legislatures would be prevented from participating in the 
formulation of these policies. 
Of the five Justices who believed the passage of the new Mary-
land law to be sufficient grounds for reversal, only Goldberg and 
Warren found it necessary to comment on the fourteenth amend-
ment argument. In so doing, they joined Douglas in his opposition 
to Black's contentions. To Goldberg, Black's position would bind 
the Negro to a vestige of slavery which imposed upon him the limita-
tions of a caste system. Goldberg inquired into the history of the 
fourteenth amendment and concluded that its framers had intended 
to provide Negroes with all the civil rights guaranteed to Caucasians. 
Furthermore, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to 
66. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
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exercise a "social" rather than a "civil" right, because the raison 
d'etre of segregated facilities did not lie in the implementation of 
a property owner's personal biases, but, rather, resulted from his 
determination to maximize profits. In concluding, Goldberg noted 
that, no matter what the ·writers of this amendment intended, 
Black's convictions could not be squared with the school integration 
decisions which had shown racial segregation to be harmful to the 
Negro as he attempted to improve his condition in our modern 
society. 
The impeccable dispassion of these opinions tends to obscure the 
emotionally charged background of Bell v. Maryland. Southern states 
were wracked with picketing, rioting, and even racial murders. 
Sit-ins had become commonplace. The Senate was stalemated in 
filibuster over the President's civil rights proposal. The Court was 
faced with the question: what role should it play in resolving the 
controversy? Although the premise of "libertarianism" is action on 
behalf of alleged constitutional rights of the individual, Justice 
Black, normally "libertarian," had taken an "authoritarian" stance 
in this situation of crisis. What impact this shift may have had on 
Goldberg and Black as ideological brethren can, perhaps, never be 
known; yet, one thing is clear: the 1964 Term saw Goldberg move 
further from Black than from any of his other colleagues. 
The class of cases which, not surprisingly, appears to demon-
strate best the intensity of the differences between Black and Gold-
berg involved the alleged civil rights of Negroes. Mr. Justice Black 
had shown at an early time that he was not as willing as Goldberg 
to cut through a mass of contradictory evidence in order to con-
clude that race was used as a criterion for legislation or other state 
action and that, therefore, such action was invalid. 67 In two cases 
decided the same day as Bell, Black refused to join his "libertarian" 
friends in finding that the due process clause protected petitioners 
against a state court judgment applying a trespass law retroactively 
so as to make it applicable to their conduct, 68 and in ruling that a 
deputy sheriff hired in a private capacity to enforce segregation was 
engaged in unconstitutional state action. 69 And, in two cases de-
cided during the 1964 Term, Black rejected both Goldberg's con-
tention that an Alabama county had perverted its peremptory jury 
challenge rule so as to screen out Negroes,70 and Goldberg's position 
in Cox v. Louisiana71 that city officials had duped civil rights picket-
67. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). 
68. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964). 
69. Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964). 
70. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
71. 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
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ers, contrary to due process, by telling them that they could legally 
demonstrate and subsequently arresting them under a law forbid-
ding disturbances in front of courthouses. Of course, there were 
issues involving the rights of Negroes where Black reached a "liber-
tarian" result,72 but his overall approach to these matters was that 
of a Harlan, not that of a Goldberg. 
There was another key difference in constitutional philosophy 
between Justices Goldberg and Black that was made evident in 
1964 and 1965. When Goldberg believed the rights of the individual 
to be in jeopardy, he was often more than willing to dispel precedent 
to guarantee those rights. Both Barnett and Bell attest to this. On 
the other hand, Black, like Douglas, could trace his roots, in so far 
as judicial philosophy is concerned, to the 1930's when he saw 
the power of the Supreme Court used to strike down legislation 
which the Court believed to be radical or unwise. As a New Dealer, 
he knew that judicial activism has its dangers as well as its bless-
ings. When Goldberg formulated an expansive interpretation of 
due process to strike down Connecticut's statute forbidding the use 
of contraceptives, Black disagreed strongly. It was not for the courts 
to invalidate laws which were believed to be "arbitary, capricious, 
unreasonable, or oppressive"; such formulas were based on "natural 
justice," and it was for legislatures, not for the Supreme Court, to 
apply "natural justice."73 This same basis for disagreement appeared 
earlier, in Jackson v. Denno, when Black accused his "libertarian" 
brethren, among others, of scrapping New York's jury procedures 
for determining the admissibility of confessions because such pro-
cedures were deemed to be unfair. He stated: 
The Court appears to follow a judicial philosophy which has re-
lied on that clause [due process] to strike down laws and procedures 
in many fields because of a judicial belief that they are "unfair," 
are contrary to "the concept of ordered liberty," "shock the con-
science" or come within various other vague but appealing catch 
phrases.74 
Again, in a lone dissent in Plymouth Sedan, he chastized his col-
leagues for grafting the exclusionary rule onto the fourth amend-
ment: "I cannot agree that because we ourselves might believe the 
practice of obtaining evidence in that manner 'shocks the conscience' 
or is 'shabby' . . . we are . . . authorized by the Constitution to 
prevent its use as evidence."75 
'12. Black concurred in the reversal of the breach of peace and obstructing public 
passage convictions in Cox v. Louisiana, supra note '11. 
']3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 (1965). 
'14. 3'18 U.S. 368, 40'1 (1964). 
'15. 380 U.S. 693, '103 (1965). 
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Yet if Black were persuaded that the Constitution granted a 
particular civil liberty to the individual, he was far more willing 
than Goldberg to expand the application of that liberty. The most 
powerful example of this tendency was his advocacy of the "in-
corporation" df all of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amend-
ment. This notion was specifically rejected by Goldberg in Griswold. 
There is a strain in Black's thinking which places an almost naive 
trust in the Founding Fathers; a belief that they set up a code 
of political values for the individual which, if protected through a 
literal interpretation of the Constitution, will provide the individ-
ual with all of the liberties he will ever need. Goldberg's view 
of the judicial power was more elastic, for it was based upon the 
premise that concepts like due process are not static and that dangers 
emanating from arbitrary state power can be so subtle and so inge-
nious as to be unforeseeable by the most forward looking of men. 
VI. CONCLUSION -
This article has attempted to capture one aspect of a Supreme 
Court Justice's total value system. To make this possible it has been 
necessary to stress both the man's individual notions of judicial 
policy-making and his ideological ties with the eight other men 
who together had to decide the pressing legal controversies pre-
sented during his stay on the Court. Surely this bifaceted approach 
is mandatory; all of us are members of groups and responsive to 
their norms _and the beliefs of their leaders, while, at the same time, 
each must live with the standards of conduct he has established for 
himself. 
Each of these tasks has required a somewhat different tool of 
analysis. Goldberg's adherence to a so-called "libertarian bloc" 
has been brought out through the use of as much quantitative data 
as could be extracted from Supreme Court decisions. On the 
other hand, the subtleties of his value orientation can be explained 
only by qualitatively assessing the major strands of his commitment 
in relation to the beliefs of his colleagues. The choice of techniques 
has been entirely pragmatic. Quantitative methods provide a certain 
rigor and clarity which qualitative approaches cannot match; but 
they are useless if they do not measure reliably the choices with 
which decision-makers are faced. Furthermore, it is obvious that 
computers cannot tell us very much about the real differences of 
opinion between people. It is true they are able to determine that 
Goldberg agreed more often with Brennan than with Black. They 
can also identify the classes of cases where disputes were most prev-
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alent. But they cannot provide edification as to whether one dis-
agreement is more important than eight agreements, nor can they 
tell us whether a category of disagreements has any greater implica-
tions in describing and characterizing the attitudes of Justices than 
are plainly evident from the cases themselves. " 
Keeping in mind, then, the respective roles of qualitative and 
quantitative analysis in interpreting our data, an examination of all 
that has gone before yields the conclusion that Goldberg, while a 
"libertarian," was closer in his commitment to the credo to Brennan 
and Warren than he was to Douglas and Black. To be sure, his dis-
agreements with Brennan and Warren are significant to the student 
of constitutional law, but, generally speaking, they are confined to 
discrete classes of litigation. On the other hand, his antagonism 
toward the civil liberties postures of Douglas and Black is often 
so basic as to cut across several categories and, thus, to reach the 
level of philosophical disharmony. 
In a sense, the differences between Goldberg and Douglas con-
stitute a small, but meaningful, illustration of the divergent outlooks 
one might often expect to find among Justices even if the liberty-
authority continuum under investigation is one-dimensional. In 
other words, we may assume that all Supreme Court members would 
have somewhat varying conceptions of how best to balance a citizen's 
community obligations with his individual rights even if there were 
general agreement as to what correlative obligations and rights were 
most appropriate for our society at a given time. These differences 
in view would range from the trivial to the widespread, from the 
random to the consistent. That the liberty-authority continuum for 
the Court tended toward unidimensionality is evidenced by the fact 
that there is a near congruence between Goldberg's ideological 
adherents and the "libertarians" with whom he typically joined in 
decision-making. In the case of Goldberg and Douglas, the best 
evidence that there is only one level of tension at work is the fact 
that Douglas, with the exception of Griswold v. Connecticut, always 
weighted the scales of policy-making in favor of personal rights as 
heavily as did Goldberg; indeed, in a wide variety of significant 
cases, he managed to go even further. 
When we examine the Goldberg-Black relationship, however, the 
utility of the liberty-authority continuum decreases considerably. 
Obviously, this concept is no more accurate a description of the 
relationship benveen Goldberg and Black than would be a descrip-
tion of American politics in terms of a struggle between activists and 
restrainers, liberals and conservatives, or relativists and absolutists. 
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Rather, Black and Goldberg are individuals who accept the pri-
macy of "libertarian" values, but who in large measure cannot 
concur on the nature of the component parts of the "libertarian" 
system or on the interrelationship of those parts. 
Finally, there is one other thing that numbers cannot do, and 
that is to assess normatively the values of the Justices. No one 
would argue this point. This article offers no judgment, considered 
or otherwise, as to whether Mr. Justice Goldberg's jurisprudence 
was better than that of any or all of his brethren. Such an evaluation 
must wait for another day. It is to be hoped, however, that in terms 
of the "liberty-society" alternative presented here, all of the data 
one will need in order to make this assessment have been gathered 
and presented. 
APPENDIX A 
NOTES ON METHODOLOGY 
There has been some disagreement among scholars as to the most 
feasible means by which one can make use of Supreme Court deci-
sions to demonstrate empirically voting patterns among Justices. 
The basic controversy appears to center around the question whether 
one is trying, or should be trying, to measure issues or votes. C. Her-
man Pritchett, who initially demonstrated the fruitfulness of em-
pirical analysis of Supreme Court decision-making, seemed to advo-
cate the former approach.1 He coded the policy preferences of J us-
tices only in non-unanimous, formal opinions appearing in the 
first section of the United States Reports, including "per curiams 
reported in the same manner as full opinions."2 Furthermore, he 
counted opinions, not cases, 3 so that several cases decided by one 
opinion were counted together as one.4 It follows that one dissent 
applicable to more than one formal opinion was probably treated 
as a single dissent rather than as two (or more) negative votes.5 
Finally, Pritchett evaluated certain concurrences as dissents depend-
ing upon whether the cleavage represented "a fundamental diver-
1. His landmark studies are PRITCHEIT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT (1954) 
[hereinafter cited as CIVIL LIBERTIES]; and PRITCHEIT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY 
IN JUDICIAL PoLmcs AND VALUES, 1937-1947 (1948) [hereinafter cited as THE ROOSEVELT 
COURT]. 
2. CIVIL LIBERTIES at 257 n.39. 
3. THE ROOSEVELT COURT at 289 n.2. 
4. However, companion cases requiring opinions of their own, no matter how 
brief, were individually included in his sample. 
5. This is Schubert's conclusion. See SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOR 164 (1959). My understanding (though not my evaluation) of Pritchett's 
quantitative methodology is predicated in some measure on Schubert's earlier re-
search. See id. at 78-80, 164-66. 
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gence in judicial attitude from that of the majority [opinion],"6 
and, evidently, coded tw-o Justices as agreeing in dissent only when 
they signed the same opinion.7 The Pritchett approach in quantita-
tively examining the civil libertarian attitudes of Justices appears to 
be essentially this: Inspect the facts of each opinion to see if a due 
process, free speech, or similar claim is involved, read the case, and 
then code each participant depending upon his approval or disap-
proval of the claim. Any voting bloc which emerges will be the 
function of the Justice's "libertarian" sentiments and their percep-
tions of the Court's role as a decision-maker in our society.8 
Glendon Schubert's use of bloc analysis differs radically from 
Pritchett's.9 Pritchett's technique, Schubert believes, is feasible only 
for determining the power structure and strength of conflicting 
factions on the Court. The investigation of judicial attitudes to-
ward issues can better be conducted through scalogram and factor 
analysis. The result is that Schubert counts votes, not opinions. All 
cases stand on their own because "the underlying assumption is that 
each justice makes a separate decision in each case .... "10 Obviously 
all concurrences must be coded as agreements with the majority, 
while all dissenters are considered allies. 
To the extent that the present investigation relies on content 
analysis, it is surely closer to Pritchett's orientation than to the 
Schubert approach. Still, some of Pritchett's methodological notions 
were deemed inappropriate to this study. No decision was included 
unless it presented some unique constitutional issue. The purpose for 
so limiting the sample was to prevent the data from becoming stilted 
through the inclusion of duplicate items. Pritchett recognized this 
problem as crucial when he stated: "[counting such decisions] does 
result in giving multiple weight to alignments on a single issue 
arising out of almost identical factual situations."11 Nevertheless, 
Pritchett counted all cases of a particular genre whether or not they 
were unique. Another difference between Pritchett's methods and 
those used in this study is that, in this investigation, Justices are 
sometimes coded as "libertarian" or "non-libertarian" allies irrespec-
tive of whether they overtly concurred in one another's opinions. 
A special attempt has been made here to isolate the several con-
flicting strains of "libertarian" ideology contained within a single 
6. THE ROOSEVELT COURT at 289 n.2. 
7. "In such cases [where colleagues join in opposition for different reasons] the 
dissenting justices may need to be sbown as disagreeing with the majority but also 
as disagreeing with the other dissenters." CIVIL LIBERTIES at 275 n.l (ch. IX); see 
SCHUBERT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 165. 
8. CIVIL LIBERTIES at 186-92. 
9. See SCHUBERT, op. cit. supra note 5, ch. III. 
IO. Id. at 79. 
11. CIVIL LIBERTIES at 274-75 n.I. 
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decision. Under the techniques developed by Pritchett for measur-
ing adherence to an ideology, a case such as Quantity of Books would 
be treated merely as a free speech controversy, with seven Justices 
coded as having supported plaintiff's allegations while the minority 
of two would be classified as being opposed to the claim.12 With 
due deference, this system of scoring tells us almost nothing about 
the marrow of constitutional doctrine at stake in this controversy. 
The approach utilized here also avoids the use of Guttman scaling 
analysis, which Schubert believes to be adequate £or the testing of 
the civil libertarian notions of the Justices. Yet, in explaining his 
theory, Schubert states: "The justices respond, not by the words 
they use in their Opinions, but by the ways in which they vote."13 
Thus, Schubert would deal with Quantity of Books just as Pritchett 
would, throwing it into the "free speech hopper" and coding it as 
a seven to two "libertarian" judgment. To the author's knowledge, 
all previously published studies involving cumulative scaling of 
Supreme Court decisions in civil liberties cases suffer from this draw-
back.14 
There are tw'O criticisms of the scaling approach to quantifying 
judicial decision-making that some might find applicable to the 
methods adopted in this study. Becker, in a recent publication, has 
disputed the argument lodged by Schubert and Harold Spaeth that 
scaling can account £or the "attitudes" of Justices.15 After all, he 
claims, votes are only votes and what they mean in terms of causal 
relations cannot be verified empirically merely by arranging the 
votes in some order. While Becker's point is well taken, it cannot 
be said to be relevant to a quantitative approach that gauges overtly 
stated attitudes themselves. A closely related, but somewhat different, 
criticism comes from Joel Grossman. He questions Ulmer's (and, 
necessarily, Schubert's) scalograms because they order a hierarchy of 
cases predicated on one variable, such as civil liberties, free speech, 
or economic liberalism.16 The £act is that different Justices, he 
claims, perceive a controversy in different ways. For example, how 
could one consider Frankfurter as casting a vote against a due 
process claim when he thinks of the case as "primarily a question 
of achieving a federal balance in criminal proceedings. . . .''17 It 
12. Id. at 190. 
13. SCHUBERT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 273. 
14. See, e.g., Schubert, The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological 
Analysis, 56 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 90, 97-99 (1962); Ulmer, The Analysis of Behavior 
Patterns on tlze United States Supreme Court, 22 J. PoL. 629-53 (1960). It would be 
interesting to see if Guttman's methods could be fruitfully utilized to scale "issues" 
rather than "decisions." 
15. BECKER, POUTICAL BEHAVIORALISM AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 12 (1964). 
16. Grossman, Role-Playing and the Analysis of Judicial Behavior: The Case of 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 11 J. PUB. L. 285 (1962). 
17. Id. at 293. 
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cannot be denied that Justices view cases, from a normative stand-
point, in terms of their particular scales of values. But whether a 
Justice's "societal" view is colored by so-called institutional factors 
(for instance, he may not believe that the judiciary is responsible 
for redressing this class of grievances), or is a product of his "au-
thoritarian personality," his stand on the issue still represents an 
interpretation of constitutional law and, in the Frankfurter opinion 
just mentioned, a vote against a due process claim. 
APPENDIX B1 
CASES TAKEN FROM THE 1962 TERM 
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
*Arlan's Dep't Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962). 
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).2 
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963). 
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963). 
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963). 
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
*Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).3 
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963). 
*Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963). 
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).4 
*Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341 (1963).15 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
1. A case that has been "starred" is one which the "libertarians" were in disagree• 
ment over the application of a constitutional right. Decisions containing two or 
more issues :requiring "libertarian" or "societal" responses have been indicated 
through app:ropriate footnoting with the issues described in brief below. 
2. This holding presents differences of opinion as to the meaning of both equal 
protection and due process. 
3. The two issues contained in this decision are: (1) To what extent are the states 
limited by the Mapp :rule; (2) How should that :rule be construed in the instant case? 
4. In this controversy, the meaning of both portions of the first amendment's 
guarantee of :religious freedom are in dispute. 
5. :Slack, Warren, and Douglas filed a dissent based on "serious errors den}ing 
the defendants the protection of two constitutional guarantees for a fair trial." These 
were (1) legality of defendant's confession, and (2) falsity of material witness' testi-
mony. 
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*Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
* Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).1 
A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).2 
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). 
*Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
*Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964). 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
*Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964). 
*Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).3 
*Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).4 
Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. l (1964).5 
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
*New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).6 
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964). 
*Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964). 
*United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964).7 
*United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964). 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. l (1964).8 
«'Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). 
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I. The question whether the law at issue is unconstitutional was decided by a 
vote of six to two. On the other hand, Black and Douglas vehemently disagreed on 
the meaning of the constitutional right to travel abroad. 
2. There are two levels of division here. The first involves the constitutionality 
of procedures; the second, whether the books themselves may be proscribed. 
3. This case contains four issues of significance. They are: (1) Can the state de-
cide for itself whether a judge or jury shall determine the voluntariness of confes• 
sions? The vote here was six to three; (2) Is a jury required? Black and Clark an-
swered this in the affirmative; (3) Is petitioner entitled to a new trial? Again, Black 
and Clark dissented; and (4) Was the confession coerced? Black stood alone on this 
question. 
4. The four issues here are: (1) Can movies believed to be obscene be suppressed; 
(2) What is the nature of "contemporary community standards"; (3) Should the 
Supreme Court make a de novo review of all films found obscene; and (4) Can "The 
Lovers" be proscribed on this ground? 
5. The two questions presented in this decision are whether the self-incrimination 
part of the fifth amendment is "incorporated" into the fourteenth amendment, and 
whether plaintiff has been denied a right under this provision. A third issue, dealing 
with whether the theory of "incorporation" applies to all of the Bill of Rights, is 
coded in Griswold v. Connecticut. 
6. The two levels of disagreement here involve whether equal protection was 
violated and whether the court should establish the "one man-one vote" principle. 
7. There are two issues here: (1) Was Ross Barnett entitled to a trial by jury; 
and (2) Can a judge exact even trivial penalties in criminal contempt cases of the 
type at issue? 
8. The constitutional questions here involve the application of Article I, Section 2 
and the equal protection clause. 
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* Angelet v. Fay, 381 U.S. 654 (1965). 
*Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). 
*Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 (1964). 
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).1 
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).2 
*Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965). 
*El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965). 
*Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).3 
*Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). 
*Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
*Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
*Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).4 
Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965). 
Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965). 
*Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965). 
*McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
*One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965). 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
*Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).11 
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965). 
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). 
*United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).6 
*United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). 
*Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I (1965). 
I. Harlan disagreed with seven of his colleagues regarding two aspects of equal 
protection. 
2. This case clearly deals with two distinct matters. The first of these is a breach 
, of the peace question; the second concerns blocking public passages. However, the 
latter has two discernible aspects, one involving the Justices' reactions to free speech, 
the other relating to their views of equal protection. 
3. In this decision, there are disputes as to whether petitioner was denied due 
process and whether television should be barred from all criminal court proceedings. 
4. Griswold contains issues relating to the sweep of due process and free speech. 
There is also the matter of "incorporating" the :Bill of Rights into the fourteenth 
amendment. Those Justices who expressed their opinions in the Malloy holding are 
also coded here. 
5. The three dissenters disagree with the reasoning set out in White's opinion. 
Secondly, there is a difference of opinion between the dissenters and Black, at least to 
the extent that Black's vote serves to deny a "libertarian" claim put forth by the 
appellant. 
6. There are three questions: self-incrimination; the right to jury trial; and due 
process. 
